Under what conditions do challengers consolidate power and when do they fail? I propose a network theory of authoritarian leadership challenges where leaders recruit their personal contacts, and identify two complementary commitment problems. The post-challenge commitment problem occurs because coalition members may be ambitious; it is ameliorated when the challenger is a bridge between otherwise disconnected groups, because these coalitions are unlikely to mobilize against them. However, serving as a bridge exacerbates the pre-challenge commitment problem: expecting to be secure after seizing power, a bridge elite cannot credibly commit to not challenging. Thus, bridge elites are more likely to consolidate power post-challenge, but are more likely to be purged pre-emptively by the incumbent. I test the theorized mechanisms using network data covering Nigeria’s 1983 and 1985 military coups, and show that network structure explains these coup leaders’ divergent regime consolidation outcomes including leadership tenure and institutional coup-proofing.
